In order to comprehend how Hezbollah came to master the strategy of terrorism, this paper will use the two major millstone events that defined its existence: the Lebanese Civil War and Hezbollah’s entry into the domestic politics. It was during these two periods that saw a dramatic change to its identity and thus its use of terror. This paper will be separated into three sections: Firstly, prior to advancing into the analysis of Hezbollah, a brief understanding into how terrorism is defined and how root causes can come to influence the creation of a terrorist entity. Secondly, Hezbollah’s participation within the civil war will be investigated and how it used terror to advance its cause. And finally, an inquiry into its manifestation into a legitimate political party and how its perception towards terrorism may have changed over time will be adopted.
The Root Causes of Terror Explained
As explained Martha Crenshaw in The Causes of Terrorism, that the origins of terrorism functions within a framework that can be recognized as two distinct factors: the preconditions, that set the stage for terrorism to eventually occur and the precipitants, that which provide the trigger for terror to occur.[1] For instance, when concrete grievances among subgroups are formed, such as ethnic discrimination, a social movement usually develops as an attempt to pressure the establishment to address such grievances and enact reform; when this avenue becomes viewed as a failure, terrorism becomes the last resort of an extreme faction from within the broader movement.[2] Another aspect to the rise of terror could be dramatic failures by the state such as the Arab defeat in the 1967 war with Israel, which saw Palestinians realize they can no longer rely on their governments to advance their objectives thus turn towards more radicalized alternatives.[3]
The Coming of Hezbollah
The Hezbollah (or “Party of God”) was established during the Lebanon’s civil war and aftermath of the 1982 Israeli invasion and occupation. Although Israel sought to push the Palestinian presence from South Lebanon, it unintentionally created the terrorist organization known as Hezbollah by galvanizing the disenfranchised Shiites of Beirut, South Lebanon and the Bekaa Valley to militancy.[4] Once the Shiite people came under the banner of Hezbollah, they quickly began to express the message of liberation through the asymmetrical strategy of terrorism: suicide bombing, assassinations, hijackings, the kidnapping foreign soldiers and diplomats and rocket attacks; these rockets being sourced largely from Iran.
Although the Hezbollah is a recent creation, its prehistory can be traced back to the founding of Lebanese independence. It was during this period that Shi’ite people experience many of the abovementioned root causes. According to Ahmad Nizar Hamzeh’s In the Path to Hezbollah, it was the combination of four major factors that affected both the Shiites, along with the Muslim world, which set the preconditions that seduced the Shitte community to adopt the strategy of terrorism: political underrepresentation along with substandard living conditions, shifts within demographics, the Iranian revolution and Israeli invasion and occupation.[5]
When Lebanon was re-constituting itself, the two main demographics of the day – Sunni Muslims and the Maronite Christians – entered into the mithaq al-watani (national pact) that was to determine the future of Lebanese politics. This pact created a political system that formally separated the country’s various demographics and accorded a political hierarchy, where each group was proportionately represented. Although the Shia represented the third largest demographic of the nation, they were assigned the far weaker position of speakership of the parliament and thus were allowed little impact upon Lebanese politics.[6] Furthermore, their frustrations were increased by being subjected to other structural problems such as experiencing a population boom that tripled their size, rising from 25000 to 750,000 and thus increasing its proportional size to 30% of the Lebanese population.[7] This situation was compounded by the socioeconomic woes of not only being situated within the most underdeveloped sectors of the nation, but also by receiving very little state assistance or infrastructure development.[8] Further increases of resentment were provoked during the aftermath of the 1975-1976 Civil War that saw the influx of hundreds and thousands of destitute refugees and state collapse.[9] I assert that it was the presence of the various root causes over a long period of time that provided the fertile ground for Shi’ite radicalization to occur, with the main trigger event coming in the form of the 1979 Iranian Revolution.
It was the rise of Iranian Islamism that acted as a catalyst for the emergence of Lebanese terrorism. Although Lebanon was not adjacent to Iran, it was further strengthening the cross-cultural connection of ideology of Ayatollah Khomeini and the Shi’ite clergy that laid the foundations of Hezbollah.[10] It was the influence of Khomeinism that saw the radicalized Shiites come to adopt the Mackian notion that the world is divided into the ‘oppressed’ and the ‘oppressors’. Accordingly, they recoiled against the Western world had oppressed the Islamic nations, both directly and indirectly, which saw much of the economic and social setbacks and inequality. Therefore, only Wil- layat Al-Faqih (Guardianship of the Islamic Jurist) could guarantee social equality and justice.[11]The combination of Islamism and sense of justice had a profound effect upon Shi’ite radicals and thus saw the formation the Party of Allah and the nature to its quest for liberation, protection and socioeconomic improvement of the Lebanese Shia community.
While the Lebanese people were dealing with the abovementioned root causes that came as a consequence of its civil war, it experienced yet another: the invasion and occupation of Israel. While the Israeli intention was to destroy the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), and later replace the Beirut government with a Christian-dominated presence to bring peace towards the two nations, it did not factor the now-hostile Shia people that dominated the area.[12] Warring activity was occupation and the establishment of ‘South Lebanon Security Belt’. This was to establish a buffer zone that separated its northern border towns and the terrorist activity that was originating from South Lebanon. The Israeli contribution to the creation of the Lebanese terror group was later acknowledged in 2006 by former prime minister Ehud Barak: “When we entered Lebanon…there was no Hezbollah…It was our presence there that created Hezbollah”.[13]
The Ideological Pillars of the Party of God
Although root causes acted as the catalyst to the group’s formation, it also played a part in the ideological narrative as it would later dictate the direction of its terrorist activities along with the overall demeanour towards its domestic population and the international arena. It was more than a year into its existence that the infant-terror group announced to the world their 1985 manifesto known as ‘An Open Letter to all the Oppressed’. This document provided an insight into its self-perception, their interpretation of international affairs and their objectives. Upon analysing its contents, it quickly becomes apparent the goals of liberation and social support due to the influence of Khomeini’s Islamism, anti-Zionistism and its condemnation of political participation.
By declaring themselves to be the Lebanese faction of God, they considered themselves to be an integral part of the Muslim nation and world, thus it was obliged to battle against the forces of imperialism.[14] This imperialist war was seen to be spearheaded by the United States, therefore by fighting back against the US and their agents, such as the Phalangists and Zionist Israel, the Hezbollah considered themselves to simply exercising the legitimate right to restore the dignity to the nation and defend Islam.[15] This worldview also explains the Hezbollah initial rejection of political participation and therefore why they decided to focus on terrorist activities. By insisting to undertake talks with the aggressors, the authorities were seen to conspirators as the dialogue disregarded the Shit’te people once again by recognizing the Zionist occupation and aimed to grant immunity for the crimes against the rights of Lebanon.[16] In regard to Zionism itself, due to the relationship between the US and Israel, it was considered to be a bulwark into the Muslim world. By viewing the worldview through an Islamist lens, the Hezbollah arrived at three major objectives – drive Israel out of Lebanon and thus take the first step towards eradicating the presence of Israel within the Muslim world. This would imply the defeat of other foreign influences that wished to undermine the Muslim identity such as the US, France and their allies. The second objective was to seek justice over the Phalangists that was seen as enemy collaborators by working the US-Israeli forces. And finally, the creation of a Lebanese Islamic state that would act to protect against any future erosion of Lebanese identity.[17]
By reviewing their worldview, it appears that the ideology of Hezbollah is essentially based on smaller jihad, especially the notions of defensive jihad. According to the notions of Shia Islam, defensive jihad can only be implemented within the following circumstances: If the enemies of Islam attack the Muslim countries in order to terminate Islam, the attempt to control or colonise Muslim lands, to defend against any onslaught on the public wealth and national riches or the possessions of Muslims, to defend the Islamic culture and ethnic norms and to defend against the oppressed who cannot defend themselves against injustice and aggression from an aggressive oppressor.[18] Furthermore, defensive jihad has two branches that can be implemented: military jihad that enforced jihad by the hand and non-military that is jihad by the tongue.[19]
It is the nuances of the different type of jihad that explains the two stages of the existence of the Party of God. I argue it was during the initial terrorist/paramilitary phase that exemplified adoption of the military jihad and while it entered into the modern era of active politics that it saw the party emphasise the aspect of non-military jihad.
The Hezbollah Effect
It was during the initial phase of its existence, that the newfound Party of Allah carried out a decade-long campaign of asymmetrical warfare: suicide bombing, assassinations, hijackings, the kidnapping foreign soldiers and rocket attacks. As explained above, the target of their violent message of liberation was primarily the US-Israeli powers, but there also existed the element of non-military jihad that saw the advancement of social services to their people.
The earliest accounts of Hezbollah-related terror were reported prior to their official declaration. For instance, during 1983 the Beirut’s American embassy was attacked by suicide bombers that saw that not only killed 63 people but also the facility destroyed.[20] Six month later, another US embassy was attacked so furiously that it 241 US Marines were killed along with 58 French paratroopers, by an explosive so large that it left a four-meter-deep crater.[21] Further prestige was quickly gained in the Islamic world when President Regan responding by ordering the withdrawal of the remainder US forces that was stationed there as part of a multinational peacekeeping force.[22] Another notable attack upon Western powers was the 1984 kidnapping and killing of CIA Station Chief William Buckley.[23] Another notable act came in 1985 with the skyjacking of TWA flight 847, en route from Athens to Rome. One passenger, US sailor Robert Stethem, was severely beaten, shot in the head and later dumped on the tarmac of Beirut airport.[24] The last major Hezbollah-related attack that occurred during the Lebanese civil war was the 1988 kidnapping of Lieutenant Colonel William Higgins, who acted as UN observer, was tortured and murdered by the ‘Believers and Resistance’, an organization that was sympathetic to Hezbollah.[25]
Although Hezbollah had behaved as the classical example of a terror organization, it also managed to gain further creditability by its highly efficient social services for its local population. Although other terrorist organizations have also attempted to provide support to its constituents, no other non-state actor manged to rival the official government as a source of safety and justice than the Party of God.
State within a State
By becoming one of the most successful welfare providers, Hezbollah has manged to act as an alternative to the official government. As explained by Sofia Tagliabue, the reason for the terror group to invest in such development can be partially explained due to the historic conditions that the Lebanese people had experienced during the civil war and Israeli invasions, especially for the extremely poor Shia community. Therefore, by being born within this context, Hezbollah wish to address past injustices and some problematic issues of the sectarian system.[26] The other reason for this activity was inspired by the Khomeini-influence of viewing the world being divided between the oppressed and oppressors, therefore the group seeks to fight injustice by providing investment and social services the downtrodden.[27]
The consequences of these act provided Hezbollah with political legitimation and allowed the possibility to transform itself from a mere terrorist organization into a legitimate political actor. Thus, Hezbollah’s presence essentially took over the state, by replacing the government weakened by the civil war and Isreal’s invasions and filled the social and economic vacuum by the acts of nation-building. This surge of legitimization was achieved by Hezbollah creating three associations that was to deal with social work, health and education. The first association, Jihad al Binaa, managed the infrastructure of the society such as reconstructing house that were previous destroyed by the war, road maintence and the digging of wells that allow fresh water to flow into area that were abandoned by the government.[28] The second organization, El-Jarih, was in charge of health and thus provided/managed hospital, provided prostheses, sent people abroad for heavy surgery if required and helps former wounded soldiers to re-adjust into society.[29] The final organization, Nova’ nasat al shahid, arranged financial support to martyrs families by offering emergency assistance to natural disasters, war victims, the poor and children’s education.[30]
Although the establishment of Hezbollah has shown a link between roots causes and terrorism, it also changed its characteristics from violence focused terror organizations. Instead of fading away once its emancipatory or revolutionary objective become fulfilled, Hezbollah transformed itself, with the 1988 Taif Agreement and the end of the civil war, to the new political environment as a legitimate political movement.
The Institutionalism of the Party of Allah
As mentioned above, the signing of the Taif Agreement forced a fundamental change to not only Lebanon, but to the terror group Hezbollah. The document revised the power-sharing dynamics that helped end the civil war in the following year. It was recognized that 15 years of fighting by the many factions, the Lebanon and descended from being regarded as the ‘Switzerland of the Middle East’ into a warzone.[31] Therefore, the Taif Agreement was to serve as a ‘bill of rights’ for national reconciliation and reform of the political system for all sectarian groups. It essential was to provide the framework for the future constitution of a unified Lebanon. [32] Although factional rulers were not allowed to participate, due to their influence they were kept informed as they were required to disarm.[33] The initial reaction by Hezbollah was to condemn the document as perpetuating the mistakes of the past that saw to the disintegration of the Lebanese state.[34]However, despite its criticisms, it agreed to its stipulations pending on distinguishing its military wing, Islamic Resistance, arguing it represented a legitimate force of national resistance and not a terrorist group. Therefore, it was allowed to keep its paramilitary to resistance against Israeli occupation[35] giving it state-like and sovereign legitimacy.
By achieving this political victory, Hezbollah had to undergone a shift in its thinking, as it would be a dramatic shift from its early days where it was contemptuous of the political world.[36] However, when confronted with this new reality, the terror group decided to participate and thus invert their identity: instead of being predominately militaristic showing some signs of political behaviour through providing social services and welfare, they become a political party with a paramilitary wing. The aims of the organization from a traditional terrorist organization seeking revenge for Western imperialism and the vicissitudes and denouements of international affairs in the Middle East became a political party backed by military/violent tradition.
It was the 1992 national election, the first since the civil war, saw the first look at how Hezbollah would behaviour as a government. It declared that its members are legally required to support the party and campaigned on the themes of economic exploitation and underdevelopment, inequities in the political system and security. It managed to gain 12 seats, including 8 Shia seats.[37] The following 1996 election, the central point that concerned the Shia people was still the factor of Israeli occupation of South Lebanon. By being perceived as a liberation movement, it argued for national unity, social justice and human rights and won 10 seats out of the available 128.[38] However, the group never halted its terror activity as it sent a suicide bomber to the Argentinean Israeli embassy, which killed 29 and injured 220 people. It was reported in 1994 that another suicide bombing occurred in Buenos Aires AMIA Jewish community building.[39]
The Israeli Withdrawal
By the end of the 1990s a major victory was achieved when Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak announced the unilateral withdrawal of Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) from the area. He believed that by withdrawing, his nation could bring peace to the region.[40] This development created a debate within the Hezbollah: By achieving their raison d’être, the terror group faced the options of fading away or transforming into a mainstream political party and assist in implementing ‘Lebanonization’, which would simply mean Shia socio-political activism.[41]
However, with Israel no longer posing as an immediate threat it struggled to legitimize its existence it appeared to be that Hezbollah was becoming a ‘rebel without a cause’. But it was the upcoming 2006 Israel-Hezbollah War that not only saved them from obscurity, but vindicated its decision to refuse to disarm.[42]
The 2006 Second Lebanon War
The new conflict originated with the Hezbollah attempt to secure the release of the four remaining Lebanese prisoners from Israeli jails by kidnapping two Israeli soldiers. Although a counterstrike was expected, it was the disappropriate response that provided the unintended consequence of re-establishing the need for the existence of Hezbollah.
The reason that explains the response of Israel was multi-layered: it saw it as an opportunity to not only rescue their captured soldiers, remove Hezbollah from South Lebanon, pressure the Lebanese government to deploy its military to replace the presence of the terror organization and redeploy the IDF to deter future aggression.[43] In response to this, Hezbollah returned to its original stance of emphasizing its military jihad.
The war followed the pattern that was established during the previous conflicts: terrorism against a power of a state. The IDF used its conventional warfare such as it fighter jets destroying the infrastructure,[44] while the Hezbollah retaliated with short-and medium-range rockets destined for site south of the border and camouflaged explosive devices.[45] The Second Lebanon War ended when all participants agreed to agree to the UN Security Council resolution 1701 that summarized the aftermath being: 1 million displaced civilians, more than 1000 Lebanese dead with the majority being of Hezbollah, thousands of Israeli and Lebanese homes destroyed along with mass infrastructure damage, 119 dead IDF losses and Israel suffering 4000 Hezbollah rockets.[46]
Post-2006 War Existence
Once again, the Hezbollah had proven to be an adaptable entity by updating its manifesto that acknowledge that much had occurred since its inception and thus they had to evolve in according to it new political environment. For instance, it now considered Phalagists as partners in dialogue and accommodated democracy. As announced by its leader, Hassan Nasrallah, “Even Hezbollah has had to accommodate its fundamentalist religious messaging to a pluralistic culture in which piety and modernity exist side-by-side. This has required a gradual shift from the group’s Khomeinist roots toward a more contemporary Islamist nationalist approach.”[47] But it did not reform its approach to what it perceived to be their imperial aggressors, as they still regarded the US to be the ‘Great Satan’.[48]
Since the end of the Second Lebanese War the Hezbollah has continued to straddle the two worlds of terrorism and politics. Throughout the later decades there have been further attacks that have been perpetuated, or suspected, by the Hezbollah. For instance, in 2008 two terrorist attacks were halted, the first being Israeli Egyptian tourists and an attack on Israeli embassy in Azerbaijan.[49] In 2011 the Hezbollah was active in Iraq was involved in various attacks in Iraq against US forces and attempted to assassinate the Israeli Consul in Istanbul. The following year saw Hezbollah implicated in the detonation of a Israeli tourist bus in Bulgaria and were caught attempting to gather intel in Cyprus for an attack on Israeli tourists.[50]
Conclusion
In conclusion, the Hezbollah with its unique ability to adapt itself to changing circumstances has offered a unique aspect to the literature of root causes and terrorism. While conventional thought would dictate that a terrorist organization would dissipate if seduced by mainstream acceptance or the achievement of its goals, the Party of God has proven to be the exception to this rule. Upon reflecting the two phases of its existence, the civil war and the Israeli invasion, the Hezbollah has proven that root causes may act as the catalyst to a formation of a terror group, but they do not dictate its existence. Once a terrorist group is formed, it can evolve and continue its existence. Furthermore, by entering into the world of politics while maintaining its paramilitary wing, it has proven to synthesize the world of rebellion and establishment.
Upon investigating the history and ideological narrative of Hezbollah, it appears that their military and political victories vindicate the concept of smaller jihad: if a terror organization is pragmatic it can survive all forms of geopolitical changes. It essentially adopted a three-pronged model that saw to its success: it used terrorism as a form of liberation strategy, alleviate some of its root causes of providing social services to its consistency and entered into politics to officially use state power to further national security and nation building.
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[1] Martha Crenshaw, The Causes of Terrorism, (Comparative Politics, 1981) 381.
[2] Martha Crenshaw, The Causes of Terrorism, (Comparative Politics, 1981) 383.
[3] Martha Crenshaw, The Causes of Terrorism, (Comparative Politics, 1981) 389.
[4] Council of Foreign Relations, Hezbollah 2014, United States, viewed 12 November 2018, https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/hezbollah
[5] Ahmad Hamzeh, In the Path of Hizbullah, Syracuse University Press (United States, 2004) 2-3.
[6] Avon Dominique, Hezbollah: a history of the ‘party of God’, Harvard University Press (United States, 2012) 11-12.
[7] Avon Dominique, Hezbollah: a history of the ‘party of God’, Harvard University Press (United States, 2012) 13.
[8] Avon Dominique, Hezbollah: a history of the ‘party of God’, Harvard University Press (United States, 2012) 13.
[9] Ahmad Hamzeh, In the Path of Hizbullah, Syracuse University Press (United States, 2004) 14.
[10] Ahmad Hamzeh, In the Path of Hizbullah, Syracuse University Press (United States, 2004) 14.
[11] Mariam Farida, A Casuistic Explanation to Hizbullah’s Realpolitik: Interpreting the re-interpreted’, (International Review of Social Research, 2015) 10-11.
[12] Ahmad Hamzeh, In the Path of Hizbullah, Syracuse University Press (United States, 2004) 17.
[13] Augustus Norton, Hezbollah: A short history, (Princeton University Press, 2007) 33.
[14] Avon Dominique, Hezbollah: a history of the ‘party of God’, Harvard University Press (United States, 2012) 105-106.
[15] Avon Dominique, Hezbollah: a history of the ‘party of God’, Harvard University Press (United States, 2012) 108.
[16] Avon Dominique, Hezbollah: a history of the ‘party of God’, Harvard University Press (United States, 2012) 122.
[17] Avon Dominique, Hezbollah: a history of the ‘party of God’, Harvard University Press (United States, 2012) 111-112.
[18] Joseph Alagha, The Shifts in Hizbullah’s Ideology, Amsterdam University Press, 2001) 84-86.
[19] Joseph Alagha, The Shifts in Hizbullah’s Ideology, Amsterdam University Press, 2001) 84-86.
[20] Hala Jaber, Hezbollah: Born with a Vengeance, (Columbia University Press, 1983) 76.
[21] Hala Jaber, Hezbollah: Born with a Vengeance, (Columbia University Press, 1983) 77.
[22] Council of Foreign Relations, Hezbollah 2014, United States, viewed 12 November 2018, https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/hezbollah
[23] Hala Jaber, Hezbollah: Born with a Vengeance, (Columbia University Press, 1983) 117-118.
[24] Augustus Norton, Hezbollah: A short history, (Princeton University Press, 2007) 77.
[25] Augustus Norton, Hezbollah: A short history, (Princeton University Press, 2007) 77.
[26] Sofia Tagliabue, ‘Inside Hezbollah: The al-Mahdi Scouts, Education and Resistance, (Digest of Middle East Studies, 2015). 75.
[27] Sofia Tagliabue, ‘Inside Hezbollah: The al-Mahdi Scouts, Education and Resistance, (Digest of Middle East Studies, 2015). 75.
[28] Anisseh Engeland, From Terrorism to Politics, (Ashgate Publishing Company, 2008) 38.
[29] Anisseh Engeland, From Terrorism to Politics, (Ashgate Publishing Company, 2008) 39.
[30] Anisseh Engeland, From Terrorism to Politics, (Ashgate Publishing Company, 2008) 39.
[31] Stephan Rosiny, ‘Lebanon’s Unfulfilled Ta’if Agreement of 1989 Revisited’ (Civil Wars, 2015) 491.
[32] Joseph Alagha, The Shifts in Hizbullah’s Ideology, Amsterdam University Press, 2001) 40.
[33] Lebanon’s Unfulfilled Ta’if Agreement of 1989 Revisited 490
[34] Joseph Alagha, The Shifts in Hizbullah’s Ideology, Amsterdam University Press, 2001) 40.
[35] Joseph Alagha, The Shifts in Hizbullah’s Ideology, Amsterdam University Press, 2001) 40.
[36] Augustus Norton, ‘The role of Hezbollah in Lebanese Domestic Politics’, The International Spectator, 2007) 480.
[37] Augustus Norton, ‘The role of Hezbollah in Lebanese Domestic Politics’, The International Spectator, 2007) 482.
[38] Anisseh Engeland, From Terrorism to Politics, (Ashgate Publishing Company, 2008) 40.
[39] Israel Ministry of Forign Affairs, Hezbollah – International terrorist organization 2013, viewed 19 May 2018, http://mfa.gov.il/MFA/ForeignPolicy/Terrorism/Hizbullah/Pages/Hezbollah-International-terrorist-organization.aspx
[40] Eyal Zisser, ‘Hizballah and Israel (Israel Affairs, 2006). 88.
[41] Eyal Zisser, ‘Hizballah and Israel (Israel Affairs, 2006). 89.
[42] Military Strategy and Conduct of 2006, Iver Gabrielsen p. 435
[43] Military Strategy and Conduct of 2006, Iver Gabrielsen p. 436
[44] Sanu Kainikara, Pathways to Victory, Air Power Development Centre (Australia, 2007) 50.
[45] Russell Glenn, All Glory is Fleeting, RAND Corporation, (United States, 2012) 6.
[46] Russell Glenn, All Glory is Fleeting, RAND Corporation, (United States, 2012) 11-12.
[47] Council of Foreign Relations, Hezbollah 2014, United States, viewed 12 November 2018, https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/hezbollah
[48] Joseph Alagha, The Shifts in Hizbullah’s Ideology, Amsterdam University Press, 2001) 53.
[49] Israel Ministry of Forign Affairs, Hezbollah – International terrorist organization 2013, viewed 19 May 2018, http://mfa.gov.il/MFA/ForeignPolicy/Terrorism/Hizbullah/Pages/Hezbollah-International-terrorist-organization.aspx
[50] Israel Ministry of Forign Affairs, Hezbollah – International terrorist organization 2013, viewed 19 May 2018, http://mfa.gov.il/MFA/ForeignPolicy/Terrorism/Hizbullah/Pages/Hezbollah-International-terrorist-organization.aspx